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Broadband “open access” regulation mandates openness of conduits (e.g. upgraded
cable television) to service providers (e.g. America Online), but policy discussion
often suggests that the ultimate goal is openness to advanced content (streaming
video, interactive e-commerce, etc.). We deﬁne two forms of regulation, open access
and common carriage, and discuss when they are equivalent. We argue that they
are quite diﬀerent in local access broadband. We develop a systems model with free
entry and competition in all three industry segments (conduits, service providers,
and content) and examine how open access regulation aﬀects the number of ﬁrms
in each. We conﬁrm the view that an open access requirement can reduce entry of
physical conduits, and more surprising we also describe conditions under which it
can reduce the amount of content available to consumers.
JEL classiﬁcation: L1, L5, L9; keywords: open access, broadband
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Joel Waldfogel, and Dennis Yao.1 Introduction
May the owners of communications infrastructure choose who accesses that infras-
tructure? Frequently this question is cast in terms of content and conduit. Owners
of cable television conduits do choose which channels to carry. Owners of telephone
conduits are common carriers and may not discriminate among callers who produce
telephone “content.” That much is clear, but the picture is clouded when inter-
mediary ﬁrms are added between the conduit and content. That is the situation
today with regard to Internet access, and in this paper we provide a framework for
thinking rigorously about openness with intermediaries.
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 introduced resellers between the local tele-
phone conduit and the caller/consumer. Then broadband Internet put telephone
and cable companies into competition for the ﬁrst time. By law, telephone com-
panies had to open their conduits to intermediaries, ﬁrst to dial-up Internet Ser-
vice Providers (ISPs), and then to broadband Competitive Local Exchange Carriers
(CLECs). Cable companies had no such regulation, and they successfully fought
oﬀ “open access” requirements at the local and national level. But mergers in the
cable industry led to a series of consent decrees that did provide for intermediaries
between cable companies and consumers. Opinion then turned against these open
access requirements, which have been blamed for the slow deployment of advanced
telecoms services in the United States (Hausman 2002).2
Part of the cause of this controversy is that two regulatory traditions are clashing.
More important, technological change has created a new class of intermediaries,
variously called Internet Service Providers, portals, virtual conduit operators, or
content aggregators. We discuss the functions of these ﬁrms below, but for now
let us refer to them as service providers. Like telephone resellers, service providers
2Strong arguments for and against open access respectively are Lemley and Lessig (2001) and
Hazlett and Bittlingmayer (2003).
2are the middlemen between the conduit and the content, but unlike in telephone,
they are not common carriers. This means that openness of the conduit to service
providers is not equivalent to openness to content.
No clear principle has been developed as to which type of openness is more
desirable. Telephone common carrier regulation favored openness to content, but
that rule was laid down long before there was a distinction between telephone com-
pany and service provider. The ﬁrst service providers were the dial-up ISPs. These
were initially a perfectly competitive industry of small ﬁrms, and they behaved like
common-carriers even without regulation. Indeed, the technology of the Internet
made it diﬃcult for these ISPs to control web page content in any way. Now service
providers are becoming larger, more technologically diverse, and less competitive,
but still regulation focuses on the conduit, not the service provider.
This paper provides a framework for analyzing open access regulation that forces
conduits to sell access to multiple service providers. The central decision in the
model concerns a service provider (SP) that sells subscriptions to consumers and
also sells access to content providers. This means the SP is a two-sided network
(Rochet and Tirole 2004) that must determine a “price structure,” i.e. whether to
favor the consumer or the content side of the market. Here we focus on the content
side, where the SP has conﬂicting incentives: to oﬀer a large amount of content in
order to attract subscribers or to limit content competition in order to create rents
which it can expropriate.
Our model addresses the same general question as Gehrig (1998), namely whether
the owner of a marketplace gains or loses from hosting more ﬁrms. As in his paper,
we ﬁnd that with suﬃcient diﬀerentiation between markets (here SPs), there is an
interior equilibrium in which the SP owners will balance the conﬂicting incentives of
variety for consumers versus rent extraction from producers. This result echoes the
systems model of Church and Gandal (1992) who also ﬁnd interior equilibria when
3software ﬁrms choose which of two incompatible computer platforms to develop for.
Rubinfeld and Singer (2001) consider vertical integration and vertical foreclosure
in broadband, but the setting and results are not the same. They examine the
incentives of broadband providers to foreclose content that they themselves own.
They argue that a ﬁrm like Time Warner might have an incentive to exclude content
on its America Online service that competes with content produced by Time Warner.
Church and Gandal (2000) show a similar result in a hardware-software system.
Chipty (2001) empirically ﬁnds that vertical integration does cause foreclosure in
cable television. The results of these papers have parallels in our model, but in our
case “vertical integration” occurs between two downstream segments, the service
provider and the conduit. Content, in our model, is always independent.
Our paper oﬀers three contributions. First, it includes three industry segments
– conduits, service providers, and content providers – and allows for free entry in
each segment; previous papers generally consider only two conduits or SPs. Second,
we do not assume that service providers are open to all content; instead they choose
how much content to oﬀer endogenously. Third, we examine the eﬀect of open
access regulation on this choice. Under open access, an SP only sells one service
to the consumer, whereas under closed access the integrated conduit/SP provides
SP functionality, local access infrastructure, and other services like cable television
or telephone.3 Thus, the stand-alone SP has less incentive to sign up an additional
subscriber, which means that open access regulation could tip the tradeoﬀ more in
the direction of content restrictions and reduced openness of SPs to content. This
means that open access does not necessarily improve consumer welfare.
In the next section we discuss the role of the service provider. In Section 3 we
present a model of competition with “closed access,” i.e. one service provider per
conduit, and then extend the model to open access. In Section 4 we compare the
3Hazlett and Bittlingmayer (2003) discuss multi-service oﬀerings of cable television companies.
4two regimes to each other and to the dial-up-based Internet. We present extensions
to the model and conclusions in section 5.
2 Service Providers and Open Access
Communications networks consist of numerous layers. For example, the cable tele-
vision supply chain consists of initial inputs produced by studios, aggregation by
program services (channels), and distribution by cable operators (Chipty 2001).
The supply chain for broadband Internet is even more complex, consisting of a
large number of “platforms” (Greenstein 2000). Most of the platforms are compet-
itive markets, but Greenstein notes that continued competition is not assured. For
purposes of analysis, we consider three layers, “conduits,” “service providers,” and
“content ﬁrms.”4
Content Firms. The meaning of “content” has expanded relative to traditional
media like television. While movies and TV-type programming are among the cate-
gories of broadband Internet content, online retail stores, mapping services, instant
messaging, and so forth also provide content.5
While the initial business model for Internet content involved free, advertising-
supported content, ﬁnancial diﬃculties have led to a refocus on content paid for
at least partially by the consumer. E-commerce is also content paid for by the
consumer. For these reasons and for simplicity, we do not discuss advertising here.
4Wireless data, such as NTT DoCoMo’s iMode service, has a similar structure, although for
now the service provider and conduit functions are usually integrated within the same company.
We think it is likely that calls for open access will develop in wireless, and we believe our model
translates directly to that setting.
5Communications networks also allow users to communicate with one another and host their own
personal content. Coﬀman and Odlyzko (2002) argue that two-way peer-to-peer communications
are the most important Internet service, which would make other regulatory issues subordinate.
But even these peer-to-peer activities are usually facilitated by upstream ﬁrms, which we will lump
together with other types of content ﬁrms.
5Service Providers. The next stage in the supply chain is the service provider.
The pioneers in this ﬁeld were the dial-up Internet Service Providers (ISPs) that
provided a simple, leased connection to the Internet backbone. ISPs have no editing
capability and behave like common carriers, but this is a market outcome rather
than a regulatory one.6
The service provider industry has grown more diverse and less competitive. The
most prominent service provider is America Online (AOL), which engages in exten-
sive content aggregation and presentation activities. AOL explicitly charges access
fees to content ﬁrms that want to be hosted on their service. Major SPs Earthlink
and Microsoft Network (MSN) also do this, but not as actively. SPs also can dis-
criminate on quality through the use of preferential caching services. These were
pioneered by ﬁrms like Akamai, but are now integrated into the functionality of
many SPs.7 We therefore model content ﬁrms that pay an access fee in order to be
available to an SP’s subscribers.8
Conduits. The ﬁnal link in the supply chain is the conduit, the cable or wireless
connection between the SP and the subscriber’s home.9 Building conduits involves
large ﬁxed and sunk costs, so there is naturally concern with a lack of competition
in this layer. Faulhaber and Hogendorn (2000) ﬁnd that multiple wired conduits are
6Many ISPs oﬀer some ﬁltering of content to prevent children from accessing adult sites or
employees from accessing entertainment sites. ISPs also provide de facto content discrimination by
promoting certain web sites on the web browser start-up screen.
7Rubinfeld and Singer (2001) discuss the increasing ability of SPs to practice what they call
“content discrimination.”
8NRC (2002) discusses discrimination in favor of certain content and a “walled garden” approach
in which access to the general Internet is diﬃcult or even unavailable. They note that just because
a garden is walled does not mean it is small, so it is not clear that consumers would be made worse
oﬀ. In our approach, consumers perceive content ﬁrms that pay access fees as markedly better; we
do not require that the general Internet be outright disconnected.
9There may be economies of scope if the service provider and conduit are integrated. The degree
to which it is possible or desirable to have separate service providers and conduits is a contentious
issue. In this paper we assume there are no economies of scope as a benchmark case.
6likely to enter in most urban and suburban areas, provided that there are no regu-
latory barriers. Wireless competitors may also arise. Still, the number of conduits
is small, so market power is an issue.
Because of this potential for market power in the conduit layer, mergers involv-
ing telephone or cable television ﬁrms have led to calls for regulation. The late 1990s
mergers of AT&T with TCI and MediaOne led Portland, Oregon and other cities to
call for a choice of SPs on these conduits rather than a single vertically integrated
SP (FCC 1999). AT&T and its allies maintained that open access amounts to giving
away their expensive infrastructure investment, while the cable boards and several
SPs argued from a common-carrier analogy. The arguments only concerned whether
the conduit should oﬀer open access to SPs, not whether the SP(s) should oﬀer open
access to content ﬁrms. Thus, the debate was not about true common carriage. In
March 2002, the FCC concluded that cable broadband is an “information service”
and not subject to any open access requirements (FCC 2002). It also expressed
concern that open access regulation would threaten facilities-based conduit compe-
tition. The court found likewise, paving the way for asymmetric regulation of cable
television and telephone with regard to Internet access.
Open access quickly reappeared when the FTC took up the review of the AOL
Time Warner merger. In its consent decree, the FTC forced AOL to allow other
SPs access to the Time Warner cable conduit before it could oﬀer its own service.10
However, this decree was much less strict than what telephone carriers were subject
to under the Telecoms Act.11
With the 2001 downturn in the telecoms sector, deployment of new technologies
10Ironically, AOL’s inability to gain access to non-Time Warner cable systems is a threat to the
company and may reduce concentration in the SP industry. See “AOL Rethinks its Game Plan on
Internet Access,” Wall Street Journal, April 19, 2002, pg. A3.
11Julia Angwin, “‘Open Access’ Isn’t So Open at Time Warner,” Wall Street Journal, May 6,
2002, pg. B1 describes how “Cable companies can hand pick a few competitors that agree to their
stringent terms.”
7slowed, prompting concern from governments that viewed these technologies as en-
gines of economic growth. The open access regulations have come in for criticism
as inhibitors to deployment of broadband. The model we present below suggests
that these criticisms may be correct, and that open access regulation may reduce
conduit deployment and (more surprisingly) content competition.
3 The Model
Our model focuses on competition among content ﬁrms and how it interacts with
the number of SPs. We believe the focus on content is a useful addition to the open
access debate because broadband content is very innovative industry with potential
to aﬀect the overall economy while the SP industry is much more specialized.
3.1 The Game
There are M online households which value content, SP, and conduit services. Any
number of conduits may serve these households by building infrastructure. Under
closed access, each conduit operates one vertically integrated SP. A large number of
content ﬁrms may buy access to one or more of these conduit/SPs.
The ﬁrms compete in a three-stage game: (i) conduits enter the market; (ii) con-
duits negotiate alliances with content ﬁrms; (iii) consumers subscribe to one conduit
and purchase content. Consumers can only purchase content available through their
chosen conduit.
Stage 1: Conduits Enter. Let the number of conduits that enter be K. For these
vertically integrated ﬁrms, the ﬁxed cost of entry is F, which includes the capital
cost of the conduit and the setup costs of the integrated SP. We assume this cost is
identical for each potential entrant.
Stage 2: Conduits Negotiate Alliances with Content Firms. Let there be a large
pool of potential content ﬁrms, and those which enter become monopolistic competi-
8tors. We interpret this to mean that each content ﬁrm oﬀers roughly the same type
of content (e.g. multiple music servers) but with some horizontal product diﬀerentia-
tion. Of course there are in fact many types of content, but our “representative type”
approach is equivalent to having many diﬀerent types, provided the cross-elasticities
between types are low so they do not compete with one another.
Each conduit chooses to negotiate an alliance with some of these content ﬁrms.
In exchange for hosting its product, the content ﬁrm pays an access fee equal to a
share of its proﬁts. The outcome of this bargaining is that content ﬁrms pay a share
α(K) of their proﬁts, where α0(K) < 0 to reﬂect a decrease in conduit bargaining
power when there are more conduits competing.
Conduit k choooses to host nk content ﬁrms. This choice will aﬀect the content
ﬁrms’ proﬁts, so we denote the proﬁts of a typical content ﬁrm on conduit k by
π(nk). The proﬁle n = (n1,...,nK) describes the number of content ﬁrms available
on all K conduits.
We assume any costs of hosting content are constant, and without loss of gen-
erality let them be zero. We also assume that there are no ﬁxed costs of entry for
content ﬁrms. This assumption allows us to focus on the number of content ﬁrms
without concern for the identity of each ﬁrm.12
Stage 3: Consumers Subscribe to Conduits and Consume Content. Each con-
sumer purchases a subscription to one, and only one, conduit. Consumer utility has
three components: utility from access to broadband content ﬁrms (more is better),
utility from other conduit services like cable TV and/or telephone service, and id-
iosyncratic utility for each conduit based on marketing, conduit technology, the user
interface, etc.:
uk = v(nk) + t + ￿
12Adding ﬁxed costs is not a problem as long as α(K) is low enough that content ﬁrms have
suﬃcient operating proﬁts to cover the ﬁxed costs.
9We model consumer choice using multinomial logit demand, with v(nk) + t the
systematic utility attributable to observable characteristics of the conduit and ￿
the unsystematic utility with a type 1 extreme value distribution. Conduits can
obtain revenue from subscribers through a combination of monthly subscription fees,
service charges, and indirectly through advertising. Thus, the conduit captures a
share β(K) of the systematic utility.13
Since consumers buy content only through their conduit, content competition
takes place separately on each conduit. We model this competition using a reduced
form of monopolistic competition. Spence (1976, pg. 410) argues that “The entry
of an additional product has several eﬀects. It increases the surplus from the new
product, but lowers the demand for existing products and causes them to contract
output. In terms of the surplus, there are gains and losses.” This suggests that
π(nk) is decreasing and that v(nk) is increasing and concave. The total surplus (per
subscriber) from content production and consumption on conduit k is
nkπ(nk) + v(nk) + t
In most monopolistic competition models, the total surplus is increasing in the
number of ﬁrms, provided that consumers value variety enough (Mankiw and Whin-
ston 1986). But what matters for the conduit’s choice of the amount of content to
oﬀer is the portion of total surplus it can appropriate to itself. Here that is:
s(nk,K,t) = α(K)nkπ(nk) + β(K)(v(nk) + t)
13It would be preferable to model the subscription price-setting subgame explicitly. However,
games in which ﬁrms noncooperatively set quality and then price are analytically diﬃcult even
when limited to duopoly (see Shaked and Sutton (1982) for pure vertical diﬀerentiation, Ferreira
and Thisse (1996) for Hotelling horizontal diﬀerentiation with quality choice, and Rhee (1996)
for the multinomial logit with quality choice). Using a duopoly model to study broadband open
access would assume away one of the goals of the policy, namely entry of additional SPs into the
market. We believe our approach, where the conduits retain shares α and β of producer and
consumer surplus, captures the important intuition behind the quality/price choice while allowing
us to consider entry of any number of ﬁrms.
10The behavior of this appropriable surplus function s(·,·,·) is crucial to the outcome
of the model. If s is increasing in n, then even a monopoly conduit would want
to oﬀer as much content as possible. If, on the other hand, the following property
holds, then even a monopoly conduit would choose an interior proﬁt maximizing
number of content ﬁrms:
Decreasing Surplus Property (DSP):14
snn(nk,K,t) ≤ 0 and ∃ˆ n ≥ 1 s.t. sn(nk,K,t) < 0 , ∀nk > ˆ n
Are we in fact in an environment where DSP holds? One reason to think so is
empirical: AOL, MSN and the like do in fact sell special arrangements to a select few
content ﬁrms. A second reason is theoretical and is based on price discrimination.
It is fairly easy to bargain with ﬁrms over proﬁt-sharing in alliances, with each
ﬁrm thus paying a diﬀerent “price.” Identifying diﬀerent types of consumers and
charging them diﬀerent prices is likely to be much more diﬃcult. This suggests
that α(K) > β(K), perhaps much greater, and that therefore DSP is likely to hold.
Evans (2003, pg. 337) provides a useful table showing that charges are lower to the
consumer side of the market is many two-sided platform industries.
3.2 Equilibrium
Stage 3. We solve the game backwards to ﬁnd a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
At the ﬁnal stage, consumers choose conduits according to the multinomial logit
model. The strength of the unsystematic utility is parameterized by the variance of
￿, which we denote σ. The larger is σ, the stronger are the tastes of each consumer
for his or her preferred vertically integrated conduit, regardless of the number of
content ﬁrms available on other conduits.
The outcome of the stage 3 subscription decision is a market function, which
gives the probability that a consumer chooses conduit k given the proﬁle of content
14Subscripts denote derivatives.











(1 − β(K))(v(nj) + t)
σ
￿ (1)
Market share Φk increases in the number of content ﬁrms on conduit k and decreases
in the number of content ﬁrms on conduits other than k. Since the total number of
consumers is M, the number of subscribers to conduit k is Φk(n)M.
Stage 2. In stage 2, the conduits noncooperatively choose the number of content
ﬁrms. For any nk, the conduit receives α(K)π(nk) per subscriber from each of the
nk content ﬁrms. The total proﬁt of conduit k, including revenue from both content
ﬁrms and subscribers, is
s(nk,K,t)Φk(n)M (2)
In equilibrium, all conduits simultaneously maximize (2), and we have the following
result:
Proposition 1 For suﬃciently large σ, there is a symmetric Nash equilibrium in
which all conduits host n∗ content ﬁrms and have equal market shares Φk(n∗) =
1/K.15 If DSP does not hold, each conduit hosts every possible content ﬁrm, while





The ﬁrst term in (3) indicates that a portion of the surplus in the content market
becomes proﬁt to the conduit. Under DSP, the conduit cannot capture as much of
this surplus when it hosts more content ﬁrms. Working against this eﬀect, the second
term in (3) shows that hosting more content ﬁrms increases the market share of a
conduit. But this market share eﬀect diminishes in n, so under DSP there is an
15Proofs are in the appendix. For low σ, there may be a vertically diﬀerentiated, asymmetric
equilibrium as in Shaked and Sutton (1982), but this can only be found numerically.
16Actually DSP is suﬃcient but not necessary; as long as s is decreasing in n and not too convex,
the interior equilibrium exists.
12interior optimum number of content ﬁrms. Thus, common carrier behavior is not
necessarily an equilibrium in this model.
Denote the stage 2 equilibrium total surplus that solves (3) by S(K,t) = s(n∗,K,t).








When conduit competition increases (K rises), each conduit’s market share falls,
which lowers the marginal proﬁt from hosting more content. At the same time, the
conduits lose negotiating power and the consumers retain more of their surplus,
which strengthens the marginal increase in demand from hosting more content. For
both reasons, conduit competition increases the number of content ﬁrms hosted
on each conduit. In turn this reduces the conduit’s surplus. The strength of this








When utility from non-content related services, t, increases (e.g. when a conduit
begins oﬀering telephone service), the direct eﬀect is to raise the conduit’s surplus
by β. But there is more incentive to host content because customer market share
is worth more, so n increases. This eﬀect works to decrease S, and the ﬁnal result
is that a $1 increase in t causes a less than β increase in S; indeed if competitive
forces are strong enough, a higher t could actually lower the conduits’ surplus. The
strength of this response is given by St.
Stage 1. Assuming that the conduits are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated to achieve a





There must be a solution to (4) as long as Decreasing Surplus holds.
134 Comparison of the Policies
In this section we use our model to compare open to closed access, emphasizing the
number of content ﬁrms available under each regime. We apply the model to the
current Internet and discuss the changes that are occurring in the parameters.
4.1 Conduits
Under open access, the conduit and SP are not integrated, so consumers choose a
conduit and an SP in “mix-and-match” fashion - any SP can be used along with
any conduit. We assume that consumers pay the conduit directly for its service,
and SPs do not pay the conduit anything.17
This form of open access separates the conduits from decisions regarding content.
All conduits oﬀer the same services that give utility t, so they have equal market
shares.18 If the number of conduits that enter is J, each conduit has bargaining






In principle, the change in the number of conduits under open access is ambiguous,
since we would expect G < F (though perhaps not by much). However, we can show
that open access increases the number of conduits only under implausible conditions,
and therefore we conclude that the number of conduits stays the same or decreases
with open access regulation.
Proposition 2 Suppose there are 2 or more conduits under closed access earning
17It seems natural to assume that a component of open access regulation would be explicit or
implicit limits on any fees charged by conduits to SPs (as indeed is the case for telephone companies
under the Telecommunications Act of 1996). Therefore we believe they would not constitute a
strategic variable.
18Conduits do diﬀer in service quality, uptime, tech support, etc., but strategic choice of these
variables is beyond the scope of this model.
14operating proﬁt S(K,t) per subscriber. Then the number of conduits will increase
under open access only if this operating proﬁt is more than three times the ﬁxed cost
per home passed, G/M, of building a conduit.
4.2 Service Providers
Under open access, SPs negotiate alliances with content ﬁrms and host content.
With the mix-and-match assumption, their situation is identical to the conduits
described in section 3; only the parameters change. There are two important dif-
ferences in the competitive situation of the SPs versus integrated conduits (i) SPs
do not have to build physical infrastructure, so their ﬁxed cost of entry is lower
(possibly much lower) than for an integrated conduit. (ii) The SPs do not oﬀer the
non-content related services that give consumers utility t. As a result the SPs retain
surplus S(K,0), which is always less than the surplus retained by the same number
of integrated conduits.
These conﬂicting eﬀects make the comparison of closed to open access ambigu-
ous. Totally diﬀerentiating (4), we ﬁnd that the change in the number of SPs is:
dK =
M ∂S




The denominator is positive, so equation (5) indicates that the free entry number of
SPs responds positively to the decline in the ﬁxed cost and negatively to the decline
in service oﬀerings represented by t.
We can put this comparison in terms of easily measured changes according to
the following proposition:
Proposition 3 The number of service providers increases under open access if and
only if the percentage reduction in ﬁxed costs is greater in absolute value than some











15As we discuss below, one cannot rule out dK < 0 by appealing to “reasonable”
values of the relevant changes.
4.3 Content
The suﬃcient condition for content to increase under open access is that the SPs’
retained surplus decreases even after netting out the eﬀect of the change in t:






dK < 0 (6)
From Corollary 2, the term in brackets is negative, i.e. the total eﬀect of the fall in
t is a fall in surplus. Thus the ﬁrst term in (6) is positive and we conclude:
Proposition 4 The number of content ﬁrms on a typical SP will rise under open
access only if open access causes suﬃcient entry of additional SPs:
∃δ ≥ 1 s.t. dn > 0 iﬀ dK ≥ δ
Open access can only lead to more content being oﬀered if it results in positive
entry of SPs into the market. If it fails to produce such entry, then it would reduce
the amount of content available to the consumer.
4.4 Parameterization
The dial-up-based Internet is similar to the open access model because many SPs
are available over the telephone conduit. Given the small scale of many dial-up SPs,
it appears that the ﬁxed costs are very low. The low price of dial-up SP service
relative to local telephone service suggests that t is large relative to S. Currently
the low ﬁxed costs outweigh the high value of t, so there are large numbers of dial-up
SPs in the market.
For some time now, SPs have been introducing advanced technologies and ser-
vices that create higher ﬁxed costs and more product diﬀerentiation (Greenstein,
162000). The trend toward product diﬀerentiation is illustrated by the increased dom-
inance of America Online, a company that was initially expected to lose market
share relative to smaller, lower-priced rivals. The advent of broadband local access
is bringing more changes as SPs adapt to increasingly demanding content.
All indications are that there will be fewer, more diﬀerentiated SPs. In the model,
we showed that an increase in SP horizontal diﬀerentiation reduces the number of
content ﬁrms. This leads to an important conclusion: even if consumers continued
to access the Internet using the telephone, there would likely be changes in Internet
market structure. SP industry consolidation and evolution would reduce the amount
of content competition even without broadband.
Using our model results, we discuss four stylized scenarios for the future of the
SP industry. We do not present these scenarios as deﬁnitive predictions, but merely
as examples showing that our model is plausibly consistent with either success or
failure of open access from a policy perspective.
In all four scenarios, we assume that under closed access, SP service would be
provided by cable TV and telephone companies that sold other high-value services
to their customers. This implies a high t, and thus a large loss in surplus from
removing that t. Based on the fact that broadband SP service generally costs a bit
less than either telephone or cable TV service, we use a working assumption that
t/S = 70%. That is, SP service produces a bit less than one-third the total value
of a combined broadband/telephone/TV service oﬀering. We also let St = 30% and
β = 50%, meaning that every $1 increase in t causes a potential 50 cent increase
in retained surplus, but that 20 cents of this is lost due to increased competition
between the SPs.
Scenario 1: The Dial-Up Internet. The “classic” Internet industry is charac-
terized by very low ﬁxed costs and near-perfect competition between SPs (ignoring
AOL), as opposed to much higher costs for conduits. Thus, dF/F ≈ −100%, which
17means dK > 0. In such a competitive environment, entry of a third or fourth SP
reduces total surplus considerably, say SK/S = −50%. Plugging these values into
(6) gives
(0.80 − 1)(−0.70) − 0.50dK < 0 if dK > 0.28 (7)
Thus any entry at all will increase content in this scenario.
Scenario 2: Main Street. Suppose that SP competition is becoming less intense
(as suggested by AOL’s high share of the dial-up market) but that it remains in-
expensive to set up an SP. Then we still have dF/F ≈ −100%, but now perhaps
SK/S = −10%. Then,
(0.80 − 1)(−0.70) − 0.10dK < 0 if dK > 1.4 (8)
Now it becomes crucial that a more substantial amount of entry occur, although
indeed this is still reasonably likely.
Scenario 3: The Airlines. If scale and technology are the major drivers of change
in the SP industry, then SPs will become larger and will have higher ﬁxed costs.
Then dF/F will be smaller, and if dF/F < 56%, dK will actually be negative. If
SPs nevertheless compete vigorously, added content would still require dK > 0.28
as in scenario 1, but now that would be less likely to occur.
This tradeoﬀ has some similarities to airline deregulation. Under regulation,
airlines were tied to certain airports and/or certain routes, with the resulting proﬁts
supporting a large number of airlines. Deregulation led to falling proﬁt margins and
fewer, larger-scale airlines. “Content” variety fell, since the number of cities with
jet service and the number of city-pairs with non-stop service fell.
Another lesson from the airlines is that ﬁrms will try to ﬁnd unforeseen ways to
control infrastructure. Since deregulation, the primary airline competitive strategy
has been avoiding “open access” to airports by creating hub-and-spoke networks.
Scenario 4: IBM and Microsoft. The worst case scenario for open access is that
18ﬁxed costs are rising in the SP industry, and competition is growing less intense.
This makes dK ≤ 0 likely, even though as in scenario 2, dK > 1.4 is required for
content to increase. Open access would actually reduce the number of SPs and the
amount of content. Thus, open access is not really the main issue for competition
policy in this scenario; the main issue is the intrinsic uncompetitiveness of the SP
industry.
This scenario has similarities to the rise of Microsoft. For years antitrust policy
focused on IBM’s supposed control of computer infrastructure, and no one expected
that the real market power lay in the operating system.
The Internet emerged to prominence in scenario 1, and in that scenario open
access is very positive for content competition. Decision-makers in the open access
debate should be mindful that the SP industry may be moving away from scenario
1. In general, the direction of movement seems to be toward scenarios 3 or 4, since
scale is increasing and competitive intensity may or may not be diminishing. In both
scenarios 3 and 4, the eﬀect of open access is not obviously beneﬁcial: it produces
less conduit competition in exchange for ambiguous changes in content competition.
5 Conclusion
5.1 Extensions
The model we have presented is ﬂexible to a variety of situations that may be
important as broadband Internet (and wireless) evolves. The following are some
possible extensions and suggestions for future research.
The Online Population. Throughout the model, the number of consumers, M,
is assumed constant. Once demand for broadband has reached a saturation level,
this assumption will be justiﬁed. During the industry’s growth phase, the number
of online consumers is growing as the value of buying broadband access increases.
19The eﬀect on content of introducing an endogenous M would be to strengthen the
demand eﬀect: more content would bring more people online. The probable result
would be greater content competition in equilibrium (under either closed or open
access).
Geographical Footprints. In this model, the conduits and SPs are assumed to
cover the same geographic area, so that both types of ﬁrms compete for the same
number of households, M. Currently the geographical size of both conduits and SPs
is in ﬂux. Many cable television systems, for example, remain conﬁned to a small
geographical area but contract with a nationwide SP (for the time being, closed
access is the rule).
If this pattern continues, the SPs may have a larger geographic footprint than
the conduits. This suggests that the SPs would be very large scale, creating an
even more decisive movement to scenarios 3 or 4. A full analysis would include a
bargaining decision as independent conduits formed alliances with national SPs.
Partial Vertical Integration: Conduits Own One SP. Open access does not in-
clude full “unbundling,” in which the conduits are prevented from owning their own
SPs. Therefore, it is likely that one of the SPs on each open access conduit would
actually be owned by the conduit. This has two implications for the model.
First, assuming these conduit-owned SPs continued to be proprietary, the mix-
and-match assumption would be partially violated. It would not be possible to
access, for example, Comcast’s SP over Verizon’s broadband conduit. If each of the
conduits’ proprietary SPs were equally “good,” this would cause no change in the
model. But if one conduit had an especially attractive SP, it would skew consumers’
conduit subscription choices.
Second, because the conduit would have some stake in the SP industry (and,
through access fees, in the content industry), its behavior would be changed. The
conduit-owned SP would have a greater incentive to provide content than the non-
20conduit owned SPs, because more content would bring in more subscribers to the
conduit as well as the SP. The conduit would also have an incentive to discriminate
in favor of its proprietary SP in terms of quality of transmission (Economides, 1998).
5.2 The Course of the Open Access Debate
The open access debate has proceeded under the assumption that conduits have very
high ﬁxed costs and are not very competitive with one another, while SPs have very
low ﬁxed costs and are very competitive with one another. The model developed
in this paper has shown that under these assumptions, open access produces much
greater competition in the content industry, though probably with the tradeoﬀ that
there are fewer conduits built. If the current assumptions do not hold in the future,
then open access has much less positive eﬀects on content competition, and can even
lead to a less competitive content industry.
The SP industry is changing rapidly as the Internet develops. This makes it
diﬃcult to determine exactly what the future market structure of a stand-alone SP
industry will be, but the success or failure of open access regulation depends on that
hypothetical market structure. In 2002, the FCC tilted away from open access for
cable (FCC, 2002) and began an inquiry into a similar move for telephone. This
culminated in February 2003 with a celebrated rupture between Commissioners
Powell and Martin over the proper way to relax open access rules on incumbent
telephone companies.19 Though the rules were relaxed, a greater role for the states
means that open access remains an important political issue.
We have emphasized that openness of the conduit to SPs is not equivalent to
openness of SPs to content. The ﬁrst is a regulatory decision, the second has so far
been left to the market. We saw in the model that consolidation in the SP industry
19A nice description with an amusing title is “The FCC Presses Auto-Destruct,” The Economist,
February 27, 2003.
21can lead to less content availability regardless of whether there is open or closed
access. If the primary policy goal is to preserve access to content, it may be more
eﬀective to consider some type of openness requirement for the SPs themselves,
rather than the current focus on regulation of the conduit.
22Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 We begin by determining what values of nk are candidates
for equilibrium. We then prove that the proﬁt function is everywhere concave for
these values.
The derivative of (1) is
dΦk(n)
dnk
= (1 − β(K))vn(nk)
Φk(1 − Φk)
σ
Thus, the ﬁrst order condition (3) can be written




The ﬁrst term of (9) is negative by DSP; the second term is always positive.
The second order condition is








s(nk,K)(1 − β(K))2(vn(nk))2(1 − Φk)(1 − 2Φk)
(σ)2 < 0
The ﬁrst and second terms are negative by DSP. The third term is negative for
concave v. The fourth term is nonpositive for the case of Φk ≥ 1
2. For the case of
Φk < 1
2, we note that if the sum of the third and fourth terms is negative, the entire









The ﬁrst terms of (10) are positive, so the inequality holds if the bracketed term is










Φk ≤ 0 (11)
If σ is suﬃciently large, then (11) holds because the positive ﬁrst term approaches 0.
23Proof of Corollary 1: From (9), n∗ is the solution to





















(1 − β)vnσ−1(1 − Φ) = 0




−sn + svnσ−1 ￿
(1 − β) dΦ
dK + βK(1 − Φ)
￿
snn + (1 − β)σ−1(1 − Φ)(svnn + snvn)
(13)
All terms in both the numerator and denominator are negative, so we have shown
that dn

































(1 − β)vnσ−1(1 − Φ)
￿
There is no change in Φ when t changes (unless t changes so much that the equi-







(1−β)(1−Φ) + svnn + snvn
(14)
All terms in both the numerator and denominator are negative, so dn
dt > 0.
Since St = dS
dt = sn
dn
dt +β and sn is negative, it is clear that St is bounded above
by β. To show that is is bounded below by β −1, we need to show that sn
dn
dt > −1.
We can rearrange this expression to
snnσ
(1 − β)(1 − Φ)
+ svnn < 0
24Since both terms are negative, this must be true.
Proof of Proposition 2: The conduit generates surplus t only. So for 3 or more
conduits to enter, it must be that
β(3)tM ≥ 3G (15)
Since S(2,t) ≥ β(3)t by deﬁnition, (15) cannot hold unless S(2,t) ≥ 3G
M .








In free entry equilibrium, (4) requires that S(K,t) = KF
M , so multiplying the ﬁrst






















Substituting dt = −t and dF
F = %∆F and rearranging gives the desired expression.
Proof of Proposition 4: The ﬁrst term in (6) is positive and the fraction in the
second term is negative. The proposition then follows immediately.
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